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Some results concerning inductive inference are surveyed.
These results are interpreted with respect to automatic program
synthesis, a special case of algorithmic inductive iruerence. The
interpretations reinforce and refine opinions concerning automatic
program synthesis, and artificial intelligence in general, which
have been previously expressed in [9] and [15]. The final section
digresses from science to speculation as the interpretations of the
theorems surveyed are extended to differentiate various cognitive
styles of learning.
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Herein a general theory of automatic program synthesis is presented. The
results presented have all appeared elsewhere and are due to the author and
others. The novelty of this paper is its presentation of theoretical results, some
of which are technically intricate and/or obscure, to practitioners who imple-
ment algorithms which synthesize programs. These results delimit the ultimate
capabilities of automatic program synthesizers. The relevance of this work to
researchers in artificial intelligence is communicated below firstly by way of an
analogy with early results in abstract computability theory and also by relating
the theorems presented to extant A1 work. Valuable intuitions concerning the
nature of computation in general were formulated during the 60's (see the pre-
face to either [12] or [11]). Perhaps the best known of these results is the
speed-up theorem in [5]. Occasionally, abstract theoretical results are incor-
porated directly into the practice of computing. For example, the first batch
operating systems had, as a consequence of Turing's results [16], a facility to
apriori bound the amount of time taken to run any given job. The refinement of






algorithms which are widely used today (see the chapter by Barodin in [1]). Just
as the early results in computability theory gave practitioners valuable insights
into the systems they were designing, the preliminary results concerning the
general theory of automatic program synthesis may be enlightening to those
currently implementing program synthesizers.
Of particular Interest is the similarity be tween the conclusions we draw
from rigorolls theorems and the conclusions of some researchers doing more
practical AI research. For example, Sussman [15] writes
"Many people working on automatic program synthesis expect that a
system can be built which will. given a description of the problem to
be solved, synthesize a "correct" program. 1 believe that this
approach is a mistake. In real situations the complete specification
of a problem is unknown, and what we really see happening is an evo~
lutionary process."
Not only are the theorems stated below consonant with Sussman's views, they
also rigorously refine the remarks by Sussman above. The notion of synthesizing
a "correct" program is made precise. The above excerpt from [15] is the focal
point of this paper.
The research described below is also harmonious with the general plan for
AI research outlined in [9]. Hofstadter believes that self reference is fundamen-
tal and basic to AI [9, pg. 714]. Self reference permeates the theory of algo-
rithmic program synthesis presented below. The statements of the theorems
involve self referential sets and the proofs (excluded from the discussion below)
of many of the theorems involve writing complicated self referential programs
or sequences of programs whLch reference themselves and other programs in
the sequence.
Hofstadter's notion of filtering evidence [9, pg. 694] is also mirrored in the
research described below. All the results presented below have a positive com-
ponent which asserts that a programs computing functions in a particular set
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can be synthesized, and a negative component which asserts that no synthesizer
eXists. subject to certain constraints. which can synthesize correct programs for
all the flmctions in a particular class. The positive results are proven by exhibit-
ing a synthesizer which, using a trivial criteria as to which evidence to ignore
and which evidence to exploit, is capable of synthesizing programs for any func-
tion in a given class. Although there is nothing deep in the particular data fillers
that are exploited in the proofs of the results presented below. the power of
using such simple filters is supportive of Hofsladter's clalm that much of iutelli-
gence is deciding which evidence is valid and which is not.
This introduction has focused on how mathematically abstract research can
be relevant to applied work in general. A more general (and more complete)
argument for the applicability of mathematical results and proof techniques to
AI is one of the major points of [9]. The next section of this paper contains the
basic definitions and the general framework of a theory of automatic program
synthesis. Several differentiable criteria for judging the success or failure of an
attempted synthesis are introduced. The precise interrelationships between the
criteria have natural interpretations with respect automatic program synthesis.
2. The General Theory
Like Sussman [15], we view automatic program synthesis as a continuing,
potentially infinite, process. The data for the synthesis process is assumed to be
a complete listing of the behavior of the program to be synthesized. Of course,
the agent performing the synthesis can only examine finitely much of the input
before producing a resultant program. Agents performing program synthesis
"rill be called inductive inference machines (lIMs). Formally, lIMs are algo-
rithmic devices which input the graph of a recursive function, an ordered pair at
a time, and occasionally output programs conjectured to compute the function
whose graph is being used as input [4, BJ. Hence, we consider only program
- 4-
synthesizers which use an explicit description of the behavior of desired pro-
gram as the input and not some more abstract problem description as
envisioned in [15]. Restricting the types of valid inputs to lIMs makes the result-
ing theory more tractable mathematically. Elaborations on the theme using
input other than the graph of a function to an 11M have been left for future
research. In fact, we may furthermore suppose, without any loss of generality to
the resulting theory, that the graph of a function input to an 11M is received by
the lIM in the increasing domain order, Le. (OJ (0)), (1,(j (1)), (2,(j (2)), ' ...
The later observation is a consequence of restricting one attention to attempt-
ing to synthesize programs for computing recursive functions.
We proceed to introduce several notions of what it means for an 11M to suc-
cess!ully synthesize a program for a recursive function f. Sussman's positive
attitude about program bugs [15] and Musa's result which implies that every
sufficiently complex program has at least one more bug to be found [13] suggest
that we ought to conSider, in some cases, the program synthesis successful even
if the resultant program does not compute the input function everywhere.
Rather than arbitrarily decide when a program computes a "sufficiently close"
approximation to the input function we will consider various degrees of "close~
ness." As in [6] we sayan 11M M EPsynthesizes a recursive function f if M,
when fed the graph of f, outputs a last program which computes f everywhere
except perhaps on at most a. arguments. By "a last program" we mean that at
some point M outputs a program, say p, and after that point, any program Qut-
put by}J is syntactically identical to p, Le. another copy of p. The "EX" abbre-
viates "explain" as M's final program can be construed as an explanation of the
phenomenon described by f [6]. ]n order to compare synthesis with two errors
with, say, synthesis with five errors, we collect all the sets of recursive functions
which are EP synthesizable by some lIM into a class called EX«. In other
,\'.,
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words, the class EXU is the collection of all sets S of recursive functions such
that there is an lIM M which Exa synthesizes programs for every function is S.
]n order to distinguish two classes, say E)(2 and Er, a set S is found to be in E)(5
and then a member of S is constructed for each 11M which can't be EX2 8yn-
thesized by the chosen 11M. The first result we will discuss is from [6].
THEOREM 1.
Suppose S is the set of recursive functions f with the property that if f is
evaluated on argument O. the resulting output is a program to compute f every-
where except on, perhaps. at most (1,+1 inputs. Then, Se:(EXG+1-EXU).
Hence, as Sussman [15] suspected, there are sets of problems (8 in the
theorem) such that no automatic program synthesizer can examine t:l.nitely
much data describing any problem from the chosen set and proceed to syn-
thesize a "correct" program, where "correct" means any desired degree of
closeness (the parameter a from the theorem). Whereas Sussman [15] presents
empirical evidence that there is some advantage to considering programs with
bugs, and Musa [13] presents statistical evidence that it is unrealistic to abstain
from using programs with anomalies, Theorem 1 proves that, in some cases,
automatic program synthesizers will benefit by tolerating errors in their output.
The proof of Theorem 1 distinguishes two types of bugs in the synthesized
program p with respect to the desired function f. Firstly, F may compute the
wrong value on some arguments, bugs which are easily found in the limit by lIMs.
On the other hand, p may nat converge on some inputs. The later kind of bug
makes it impossible for any 11M to take the program f (0) and examine some
finite portion of the rest of the range of f and patch up bugs. One never knows
whether the program in question diverges on some input:x, or is just slow in exe-
cuting. Any 11M which attempt to compensate for both the defined and
undefined bugs in program f (0) will never output a last program, and hence
,
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that 11M fails to EXa synthesize aU the functions in S. Note the very simple filter
involved in constructing an JIM which witnesses the inclusion of Sin Exa+ l , all
information about the range of f is irrelevant except the value f (0).
The notion of program synthesis described in the above does not really cap-
lure the idea of a program synthesizer which is continually revising and evolving
its output based on the new inputs received. Barzdin [3] acting on a suggestion
of Feldman [7] defined a notion of evolutionary program synthesis, which was
independently introduced in [6]. An 11M M Be synthesizes a recursive function
f, if when M is fed the graph of f ' all but finitely many of the programs output
by M compute f. The "BC" stands for "behaviorally correct." Again, we associ-
ate with Be the class of all sets of recursive functions which are BC synthesiz-
able by some 11M. Any 11M M can be algoritlunically transformed into an 11M M'
which BC synthesizes a.ny function which M can Exa synthesize: M' simulates M
on the input received and then takes the programs output by M and patches
them to be correct on the finite set of inputs seen so far by M and M'; M' out-
puts the patched versions of the programs conjectured by M. After M' has
enough data to patch all the bugs in M's last program, all the programs whichM'
subsequently outputs will be bug free. The next result which we will present
clearly proves Sussman's claim that automatic program synthesizers which con-
tinually evolve programs are strictly more powerful than synthesizers which
complete their tasks and then ignore any later arriving data.
THEOREM 2.
Suppose S is the set of recursive functions f which, on all but finitely many
inputs, output programs which compute f. Then every function in S can be BC
synthesized by a single 11M. Furthermore, no 11M can EXO' synthesize all the





A special case of Theorem 2 appears in [3] and a generalization, obtained in
collaboration with 1. Harrington. appears in [8]. In fact, a much stronger results
holds. To state the stronger result we need to define what it means for a finite
collection of llMs to synthesize a set of functions. As in [14] we say IIMs
MQIM1. ' .. ,Mn EXGsynthesize all the recursive functions in some set S if for
each f ES there is an i~n such that Mi EXrJ, synthesizes f. Furthermore, S is a
member of the class C(n+l,EXO) along with any other set of recursive functions
which can be EXU. synthesized by a collection of at most n+l IIMs. The following
theorem is from [14].
THEOREM 3.
Let S be as in the previous theorem. Then S is not a member of C(n+l,EXU) for
any natural numbers n and a.
The above result may be slightly misleading as the classes BC and C(n+1.EXU)
are incomparable [14]. That is to say there are sets of recursive functions for
which programs can be synthesized by collections of I1Ms which do not evolve
programs but cannot be synthesized by an JIM which does evolve programs con-
tinually over time. Hence. there is a potential advantage to be gained by using
evolutionary program synthesizers and a different sort of advantage which can
be obtained by using multiple synthesizers. Furthermore, the ditIerent types of
advantages alluded to in the previous sentence are incomparable.
The issue of multiple machine program synthesis deserves further discus-
sion. Returning to synthesized programs with (some small number of) bugs, one
would expect that any set of recursive functions which can be synthesized by
collection of, say, three I1Ms with at most five bugs in the resulting programs
could be synthesized more accurately (at most two bugs) by some larger co11ec-
lion of JIMs. Not only can more accurate programs be synthesized by using





desired improvement in accuracy, as shown by the following result from [14].
THEOREM 4.
The class C(m,Exa) is included in the class C(n,EXb ) if and only if
n"m o(1+[a-;-(b +1)]),
As mentioned above, there are positive and negative components to results such
as the above theorem. To prove part of Theorem 4 it is necessary to show that
some set of recursive functions. S, can be synthesized by some m-tuple of IIMs
but not by some other n-tuple of lIMs. To show that all the functions in S can be
synthesized by by some m-tuple of I1Ms. two trivial data filters are used. Firstly.
each function in S is divided inlo m disjoint pieces with each lIM examining
exactly one such piece, with no piece being considered by more than one lIM.
Another filter is used by each of the m lIMs in its examination of its piece of the
input. Again, we find more evidence supporting Hofstadter's views on the impor-
tance of data filters [9]. Other results in [14] illustrate a critical mass principle
for automatic program synthesis. That is, there are sets of functions which can
be synthesized by some n + 1 tuple of 11Ms but which cannot be synthesized by
any n tuple of IIMs. So, for machines which learn by example, diversity of per-
spective may be crucial for some tasks.
In our initial discussion of the synthesis of programs with bugs above it was
noted that, in general. one can't patch errors in a program and know when to
stop patching even if there was an apriori bound on the number of bugs in the
original program. The final result which we discuss in this paper indicates that
one can not, in general, take an arbitrary program synthesizer, look at an pro-
posed solution for some input, give the synthesizer some data and expect the
synthesizer to subsequently output a more accurate solution. As before, we
start by defining some more criteria for successful synthesis of programs by





interpretation. As in [6] we sayan lIM M E~ synthesizes a recursive function f
if M EXa. synthesizes f after Qutputing at most b +1 distinct programs. Note
that for EXb synthesis it is required that the 11M change its conjecture as to a
solution at most b times. The class EX: contains all the sets of recursive flUlC-
tions which are E~ synthesizable by some IIM. The promised interpretation is
derived from the following theorem from [6].
THEOREM 5.
The class EX: is included in the class ElG. iff a~c and b5:d, for any natural
numbers a,b ,C ,d.
In fact the E~ classes form a lattice under strict inclusion. We conclude this
section with a discussion of some generalizations the synthesis criteria dis-
cussed above. In the definition of EX: above a. and b were assumed to be
natural numbers. One extension is to allow a and or b to be "ofo" with the mean-
ing "finitely many". For example, Exa synthesis is synonymous with EX'f syn-
thesis. If M EX" synthesizes f then M on input from the graph of f outputs a
last program which computes a finite variant of f. The above theorems all hold
if * is interpreted like an integer which is larger than any natural number. The
BC synthesis of programs with bugs has also been investigated [6]. ECa, denotes
the class of all sets S of recursive functions for which there is an lIM M such that
if M is fed the graph of any f in S, all but finitely many of the programs output
by M compute f, except on at most a inputs. Different programs output by M
may differ from f on different inputs. A hierarchy unfolds by allOWing more and
more bugs. L. Harrington has constructed an lIM which BC" synthesizes every





3. Cognitive Styles of Learning
This section is devoted to comments on various cognitive styles of learning
by example. Even though the comments are based on the results mentioned in
the previous section, the remarks below are more speculation than science. In
order to draw conclusions as to the nature of how people learn by example from
our theorems, one must assume that the brain is a complicated machine.
Although this perspective is unpopular with a majority of the population. adopt-
ing a mechanistic viewpoint is a prerequisite for engaging in artificial inlelli-
genee research.
Consider a successful EX~ synthesis performed by an 11M M. M conjectures
some finite number of programs before converging on one which computes the
input function everywhere. M conforms to the standard method of empirical
science. Le. gather more data. test the current conjecture against the new data
and issue a new conjecture, gather more data ... until a conjecture is made
which is never later refuted. M's behavior exemplifies iteratively refining a con-
cept until perfection is achieved. a commonly observed cognitive style in
humans. Next consider M successfully performing an EX~ synthesis. M exam-
ines some data and then in a "flash of inspiration" outputs an answer which is
close to the desired result. 1t was Holmes [10] who first said "A moment's
insight is sometimes worth a lil'e's experience." His intuition is analogous with
the consequence of our theorems which indicate that there is a set in the class
EX; which is not in the class EX.o. 1n this case, M's cognitive style can be
classified as that of an intuitive thinker who pays scant attention to detaiL
The classes EX; and EX~ are extreme points in the EX lattice. The other
points in the lattice represent cognitive styles which are a mixture of the itera-
live perfectionist and the intuitive approximator. As the EX lattice result indi-
cates, any mixture is possible and results is unique learning capabilities. How-
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ever, I suspect that people ll:!arn many things in a behaviorally correct fashion.
That is, people tend to change their minds frequently, even when they are not
confronted with evidence which directly contraindicates their previous thoughts.
Furthermore, it is only human to resist changing ones beliefs when confronted
with an instance for which they are inadequate or incorrect.
4. Conclusions
We have interpreted inductive inference theorems for automatic program
synthesis. The resulting interpretations were consistent with, even refinements
of. other ideas which have appeared in the AI literature. The theorems men-
lioned above are a scant sample of results in inductive inference which are
applicable to the more practical side of automatic program synthesis. A more
ambitious exposition of the application of inductive inference to automatic pro-
gram synthesis is planned [2]. ln summary. most of this paper has been devoted
to draWing conclusions about automatic program synthesis from theoretical
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